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"[T]he First An1endment cannot pern1it anyone who cries 'artist' to have carte
blanche when it con1cs to nan1ing and advertising his or her works, art though it
may be."
--- Judge H olschuh 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many notorious gangsters of the twentieth century are glorified through books, parades,
television, and film. 2 The lives of these bandits developed a gangster genre that has flourished
throughout the years. 3 This all makes for good business; however, it becon1es proble1natic when
a gangster's name is federally registered as a traden1ark.

4

In today's 1narket, we have

sophisticated criminals like Martha Stewart, and allegedly heinous crin1inals like O.J. Simpson,
who are in the public eye, and have interacted with traden1ark law in one facet or another. 5 Such
interesting events raise the question of whether a cri1ninal's name should be registered by the
United States Patent and Traden1ark Office ("USPTO"), the an1ount of protection a criminal's
mark should receive; specifically, when cmnpanies use the mark in tnedia containing product
placement or inter-active purchasing options.

1

See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing use of an artists ' name within the
permissible scope of the First Amendment) .
2
See Gangster Films Take Revenge on our Behalf, MSNBC.COM (June 28, 2009, 8:31 AM),
http://today. msnbc .msn. com/id/3 15 73 5 08/ns/today-entertainment/t/ gangster-film s-take-revenge-ourbehalf/#.TrHGHvQUqso ("Images of darkly ambitious men in snazzy suits performing antisocial acts have been
popular for almost as long as it has been possible to capture them on film, through good times and bad."); Southern
Arizona Transportation Museum, Dillinger Days Commercial, YouTuBE (June 27, 2009),
http://www .youtube .com/watch?v=2x76rqHyOd8&feature=player_embedded (local Southern Arizona "Dillinger
Days" Commercial).
3
See People & Events: The Era of Gangster Films, 1930-1935, Pss
http://www .pbs .org/wgbh/amex/dillinger/peopleevents/e_hollywood.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012, 6:40PM)
(discussing gangster genre in film).
4
See Dillinger, LLC. v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U .S . Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *2
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (holding that EA was entitled to summary judgment on its First Amendment defense
because Dillinger, LLC did not raise any issue of fact, regarding Dillinger's relevance to the content of the
Godfather video games); ANNE GILSON LALONDE, Use of Dillinger for Virtual Weapons in Video Games Protected
by First Amendment, LExrsNEXIS, July 7, 2011, available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5755 (discussing the background
and procedural history of Dillinger v. EA).
5
See, The Verdict on Martha, CNNMONEY, http :l/money.cnn.com/2004/03/05/news/companies/martha_ verdicl/
(last updated March 10, 2004: 1:51 P.M); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F3d 1092 (D .C. Cir. 1999) (An individual filed an
opposition against Orcnthal James Simpson's registration of trademarks for his name and nickname, including "O.J.
Simpson," "O.J.," and "The Juice.").

2

Generally, the use of a trademark in non-commercial n1edia raises a First Amendment
tssue. A perfect example of this issue is raised in Dillingej'" v. EA. 6 John Dillinger ("J.D."), an
infamous bank robber during the 1930's, 7 has descendants who frequently engage in trade1nark
infringetnent litigation.8 Recently, Dillinger, LLC,9 a company forn1ed by J.D.'s descendants,
sued Electronic Arts, Inc. 10 ("EA") for trademark infringement because EA used the name
Dillinger in its video games.

11

EA raised a First Amendment defense and shortly thereafter, the

case was dismissed. 12
Currently, the Rogers v. Grimaldi 13 test (also known as the artistic relevance test) is the
test predominantly used by courts to decide whether there is a valid First An1endment defense in
a trademark infringement claim; however, the alternative avenues test and likelihood of
confusion test are also used.

14

Being the predominant test does not mean that the artistic

relevance test provides an equitable balance between First An1endment rights and trademark

rights. An analysis of existing case law indicates that courts inconsistently apply the Rogers v.

6

See Dillinger, 2011 U .S . Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *2 .
See generally BRYAN BURROUGH , PUBLIC ENEMIES xii (The Penguin Press) (2004) (chronicling lives of famous
criminals and their exploits).
8
See Millions at Stake as EA Sues Bank Robber's Relative Over Godfather Gam e Machine Guns,
GAMEPOLITICS.COM, http ://gamepolitics.com/2009/09/02/millions-stake-ea-sues-bank-robber039s-relative-overgodfather-game-machine-guns (Sept. 2, 2009) (discussing EA's filing in the Northern District Court of California
seeking a declaratory judgment that would allow it to use the mark Dillinger in its video games).
9
See Dillinger, 2011 U .S . Dist. LEX IS 64006, at *4 (S .D. Ind . June 16, 2011) ("Plaintiff claims to own the publicity
rights of the 'late depression-era bandit' John Dillinger, as well as the trademark rights in the words 'John
Dillinger."') .
10
EA is a global interactive entertainment software company that was developed in 1982. The company develops ,
publishes, and distributes interactive software for video game systems among other devices. See EA.COM,
http://aboutus.ea.com/home .action.
11
See Dillinger, LLC. v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No . 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *2
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011).
12
See id.
13
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2nd Cir.l989) (holding that the Lanham Act should apply to movi e
titles only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression,
unless the title has no artistic relevance, or if the title does have some artistic relevance , the title does not explicitly
mislead the public.)
14
See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 f. 3d 188, 207(5 th Cir. 1998); Mutual ofOmaha, Ins . Co . v.
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, (8th Cir. 1987); LALONDE, supra note 4.
7

3

Grimaldi test, probably because it is unclear regarding its test; and, courts still apply other tests. 15
In this note, Part II will provide biographical information on the notorious bandit J.D. and
discuss Dillinger v. EA. 16 Part III will provide a general background on trademark law topics
relevant to Dillinger v. EA,

17

including a survey of federal court decisions involving the First

Amendn1ent defense in traden1ark infringement clai1ns, 18 and a proposed fourth test that can
clarify the confusion in existing case law. 19 Lastly, Part IV of this Note concludes by declaring
the need for consistency mnong the federal courts, which need to provide a test that combines all
three tests in order to preserve First Amendment protections, trade1nark protections, and overall
legal consistency. 20

II.

BACKGROUND

a. John Dillinger's biographical information
In Dillinger v. EA, the trademark at issue was the name of the infamous J.D. The court
described J.D. as a "legendary gentleman-bandit," but, according to the FBI, J.D. was a

15

Compare, Rogers, 875 F .2d at 1005 ("To properly analyze this issue, the Court must therefore consider a two-part
test: First, the Court must determine whether the use of the mark has any artistic relevace to the underlying work
whatsoever; second, if the use of the trademark has some relevance, the Court must detem1ine whether it explicitly
misleads the public as to the source or content ofthe work"), with Twin Peaks Prod . Inc. v Publ'n Int'l, Ltd. , 996
F.2d 1366, 1379-1380 (holding that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act unless the title has no artistic
relevance, however, if the title does have artistic relevance the title must explicitly mislead the public according to
the Polaroid factors.), No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 F .Supp . 1381, 1383-1384 (C.D. Cali. 1995)
(analyzing Rogers' first prong by determining artistic relevance and the second prong by analyzing the likelihood of
confusion factors, and then weighing Plaintiff's showing of likelihood of confusion against defendants' First
Amendment concerns), and Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d at 959 (stating that the "no
adequate alternative avenues" test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression" and
that "[P]roof of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of confusion"), White
v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To prevail on her Lanham Act claim,
White is required to show that in running the robot ad, Samsung and Deutsch created a likelihood of confusion"),
and Mutual of Omaha, Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d at 397 ("Mutual trademarks are a fonn of property, and Mutual's
rights therein need not "yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate
altemative avenues of communication exist.") (citations omitted).
16
See infra pp. 4.
17
See infra pp. 10.
18
See infra pp. 15.
19
See infra pp. 21 .
20
See infra pp. 26.

4

-------------------

----

"notorious and vicious thief," and a "lurid desperado" who evoked the gangster era. 21 J.D. was
born on June 22, 1903, in Indianapolis, Indiana. 22 He was born to John Dillinger, Sr. and Mary
Ellen Lancaster, and was the youngest of three children. 23 Unfortunately, J.D .' s n1other, Mary
Lancaster, died of a stroke when he was barely four years old.

24

Thereafter, his father 1noved the

family to Mooresville, Indiana so that J.D. could stay out of trouble. 25
At the age of sixteen, J.D. dropped out of school, rebelling against his father's advice, and
continued to work at his job eighteen miles away from their new hmne? 6 J.D . comtnitted his
first recorded crime, car theft, in Mooresville, Indiana.

27

During this tin1e, his wild behavior

intensified when he began routinely drinking, fighting, and visiting prostitutes.28 In 1923, for
instance, J.D. stole a car to impress a girl on a date, and luckily escaped a police chase. 29 In
1924, J.D. tried robbing a 65-year-old Mooresville, Indiana grocer;

30

he was caught, convicted,

and spent the next nine years in prison. 31 Prison did nothing to rehabilitate J.D. Indeed, while

21

See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *4
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) .
22
See DARY MATERA, JOHN DILLINGER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AMERICA'S FIRST CELEBRITY CRIMINAL, CAROLL
& GRAF PUBLISHERS 10-11(2004).
23
See id. at 10-12. Dillinger's subsequent marriage gave J.D. more siblings.
24
See id.
25
See id. at II.
26
See MATERA, supra note 22, at 14.
27
See MATERA, supra note 22, at 29.
28
See MATERA, supra note 22, at 29.
29
See MATERA , supra note 22, at 29.
30
Allan May & Marilyn Bardsley, John Dillinger, TRUTV.COM,
http ://www .trutv.com/library/crime/gangsters_ outlaws/outlaws/dillinger/2.html (last visited Nov. 25, 20 12) . J.D.
believed that the grocer would be carrying the receipts, but he was not and the grocer fought back and accidentally
discharged the gun. J.D. ran away thinking that he killed the grocer and when he reached the location where the
fetaway car was suppose to be he found no one there .
1
See MATERA, supra note 22, at 27-32 . Dillinger actually had a long prison history . First, he went to a juvenile
facility, Pendleton, which was a "bleak incarceration center." See id. Pendelton was a "tan-colored stone buildings
with red tile roofs, thirty-foot concrete walls, and gun towers at each of its four corners." ld. Soon enough,
Dillinger requested to move to an adult facility after having his parole denied. His request was later granted and J.D.
was transferred to the Indiana State Penitentiary. ld.

5

incarcerated, he in1proved his bank robbing tactics, 32 which allowed him to rob banks with
•
.
.c:
1mpun1ty
10r
so 1ong. 33

Robbing banks was the norm for gangsters from the Great Depression Era.

34

For instance, in

1933, J.D. robbed numerous banks throughout the Midwest and broke out of jail twice.

35

Like in

today's econon1y, many citizens blamed the banks and goven1ment for the economic tun11oil
they were suffering. 36 As a result, citizens who should have decried obvious crin1inal behavior
frequently saw J.D. and other crin1inals as mythical "Robin Hood" vigilantes who were actually
defeating evil government forces. 37
One of the greatest aids to J.D.'s crime spree was his gun of choice. During J.D.'s rise to
power, John T. Thon1pson developed the Thompson submachine gun ("T01nmy Gun') for
n1ilitary use. 38

At first, the machine gun was used as a crime-fighting tool; but, like n1any

weapons used to fight cri1ne, the Tommy Gun ended up in the hands of crin1inals. The gun was
"con1pact, easily hidden and light enough that its tremendous firepower could be unleashed
swiftly from under a coat or fr01n the back of a speeding black sedan."

39

J.D.'s strong

association with Tommy Guns resulted from the large an1ounts seized from his hideouts.

32

40

See MATERA, supra note 22, at 32. During Dillinger's time at the Indiana State Penitentiary he had the
opportunity to learn from "criminal mentors," who were thieves, burglars, bookmakers, safecrackers, and other
organized crime specialists .
33
John Dillinger, BIOGRAPHY. COM, http://www .biography.com/people/john-dillinger-9274804 (last visited Nov . 25 ,
2012).
34
See PBS, supra note 3.
35
See Star Files : John Dillinger, INDYSTAR.COM,
http://www.indystar.com/article/99999999/NEWS06/80519042/StarFiles-John-Dillinger (last visited Nov . 10,
20 12).
36
See PBS, supra note 3 .
37
See PBS, supra note 3 .
38
See BURROUGH, supra note 7 .
39
See BURROUGH, supra note 7.
40
See See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No . 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *4
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011); Public Enemies Featurette, IMDB.COM,
http://www .imdb .com/v ideo/imdb/vill563177211.

6

Figure 1: 1928 Tommy Gun Submachine Gun 41

J.D.'s criminal career can1e to an end when federal agents obtained a tip that J.D. would be at
a theater with his friend, Anna Sage, 42 a brothel owner.

43

On July 22, 1934, J.D., who had

become known as "Public Enen1y No. 1" was shot in the head and chest, and killed by federal
agents after leaving a theatre in Chicago.

44

Upon J.D.'s death, J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Chief

expressed that he was delighted that his men succeeded in getting rid of Public Enemy No.l .45
b. Dillinger v. EA

Several years after his death, J.D.'s family created Dillinger LLC. 46

The owner of

Dillinger, LLC is J.D.'s half-sister's grandson; and, he clain1s rights to the Dillinger name and
likeness. 47
The dispute at the heart of the Dillinger v. EA case resulted from EA' s use of Dillinger in
its Godfather and Godfather II video gatne series.

48

The Godfather video game used "Dillinger

Tommy Gun" to name one of its fifteen weapons and Godfather II used "Modern Dillinger" as
41

This image displays the infamous " Tommy Gun" that Dillinger was heavily associated with. AR UN DEL
MILITARIA, http ://www .deactivated-guns .co.uk/detai II 1928A 1-5 .htm .
42
See People & Events : The Era a/Gangster Films, 1930-1935, PBS,
http://www .pbs .org/wgbh/amex/dillinger/peopleevents/e_betrayal.html (last visited Nov . 26, 2012). The FBI
promised Anna Sage that she would not be deported if she helped them catch J.D .. The FBI ultimately reneged on its
promise and deported Sage to Romania .
43
See Dillinger Slain in Chicago,· Shot Dead by Federal Men in Front of Movie Th eatre, NYTIMES .COM (July 22,
1934),
http ://www .nytimes .com/learning/general/onthisdaylbig/0722 .html?scp=l &sq=john%20dillinger&st=cse#article;
John Dillinger, BIOGRAPHY. COM, http://www. biography.com/people/john-dillinger-9274804 (last visited Jan . 29,
2012, 2:30PM) .
44
See NYTIMES .COM, supra, note 43.
45
See NYTIMES.COM, supra, note 43.
46
See LALONDE, supra note 4 .
47
See LALONDE, supra note 4 .
48
See LALONDE, supra note 4
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part of its downloadable "Level 4 Weapons Bundle."49 EA claimed that Dillinger LLC had
previously threatened legal action if the publisher did not agree to pay millions of dollars for
using Dillinger in its Godfather game. 5°

Figure 2: Godfather II image of the Modern Dillinger51

Figure 3: Godfather video game image of the Dillinger gun 52

The decision in Dillinger v. EA, was the court's response to cross motions for summary
judgment. 53

Dillinger, LLC's Complaint initially contained six claims, but after a n1otion to

disn1iss three claitns remained.

54

The remaining claitns involved two tradetnark infringen1ent

49

See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006 , at *7-8
(S.D. Ind . June 16, 2011 ).
50
See LALONDE, supra note 4 .
51
TenkaQ6, Godfather 2: Level 4 Weapons, YouTUBE (April 29, 2009),
http ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NDS 1D21e8j0.
52
EA Victorious in Dillinger Lawsuit, VG24/7 , http ://www.vg247 .com/2011/06/22/ea-victorious-in-dillingerlawsuit/ (last updated June 22, 2011) .
53
See Dillinger, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXTS 64006, at *2.
54
Dillinger, LLC v E1ec. Arts Inc., 795 F Supp 2d 829, 831 (S.D . Ind. 2011).
("Count I accuses EA of violating Indiana's right-of-publicity statute, Ind . Code§§ 32- 36-1-1 et seq. Count II says
that EA has committed unjust enrichment. Counts III and V, which the parties treat together and so will the Court,

8

claitns, which the court and parties agreed to treat as one, and an unfair competition claim. 5 5 In a
footnote, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit had not decided on the propriety of the artistic

relevance test. The court applied the artistic relevance test because both parties agreed that it
was applicable. The court stated:
"To properly analyze this issue, the Court must therefore consider a two-part test:
First, the Court must determine whether the use of the mark has any artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever; second, if the use of the tradetnark
has smne relevance, the Court must detem1ine whether it explicitly misleads the
56
public as to the source or content of the work."
First, the court analyzed whether artistic relevance existed and it decided that the

Godfather video game series did have a tninutia amount of relevance, which met the low
threshold required by the artistic relevance test.

57

The court noted that according to the artistic

relevance test, it was not the court' s job to detern1ine the strength of the relahon ship between a
trademark and a literary work because any connection whatsoever sa6sfies the test's low artistic
relevance threshold.

58

Second, the court determined whether the use in the gatne was explicitly misleading.59
There, the court defined explicitly misleading as requiring defendant's work to make some
affirmative statement ofplaintiff1s sponsorship or endorsen1ent, beyond the m.ere usc of plaintiffs
nmne or other characteristic.

60

Regarding this second step, the court found that Plaintiff failed to

show that EA explicitly 1nislead consun1ers; thus, EA was entitled to the First Amendment's

accuse EA of trademark infringement. Count IV alleges unfair competition. Finally, Count VI raises a claim under
Indiana's Crime Victim Act.") .
55
See id.
56
See Dillinger, .2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *4.
57
See id. at *6.
58
See Dillinger, LLC . v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *6
(S.D . Ind. June 16, 2011).
59
See id.
60
See id. at *8.

9

.
protectiOn
.6 1

Th'IS meant that according to the court, no issue of fact existed regarding

Dillinger's relevance to the Godfather series' content and EA' s use of the n1ark did not explicitly
mislead consumers. 62
Unfortunately, Dillinger LLC failed in its defense because it did not argue for a test that
Dillinger LLC conceded to using the artistic

would have resulted in a favorable outcome.

relevance test even though it contains an extraordinary low threshold to satisfy its artistic
relevance requirement. Further, the court noted that there was cmntnercial undertones in EA 's

Godfather II video game because "The Moden1 Dillinger" was a part of the "Level 4 Weapons
Bundle" that required a monetary transaction.

If Dillinger LLC would have used either the

likelihood of confusion test or the alternative avenues test it would have had a better chance at
prevailing.
Ill.

ANALYSIS

a. Trademark law as it pertains to Dillinger v. EA

Traden1arks generally serve the purpose of identifying a product as cmn1ng fron1 the
same source. 63 Federal trademark law is codified in the Lanhatn Act. 64 The Lanham Act was
enacted in 1946 with the purpose of providing incentive to register trademarks, prevent unfair
competition, fraud, and needless deception.65
Trademarks generally provide several consumer benefits, including protecting a business'
good will, assuring product quality, and strengthening consumer identification regarding a

61

See id.
See id.
63
See 15 U .S.C .A § 1127 (West 2006), SlEGRUN D. KANE,
62

WHAT lS A TRADEMARK?, TRADEMARK L. : PRAC . GUIDE
§1:1.1 (2011) .
64
15 U.S.C.A § 1127 ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof-(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in
commerce and applies toregister on the principal register established by this chapter[.]") .
65
SeeS. Rep . No. 1399, 1974 U.S.C .C.A.N. 7113 , 7114; 74 Am . Jur. 2d Trademarks and Tradenames § 6.

10

product's origin. 66 While a traden1ark can consist of various words and syn1bols, it does not
necessarily have to be a brand name. 67 For instance, the overwhelming majority of individuals
see the Coca-Cola logo and its curvy bottle shape and probably identify the Coca-Cola brand,
which of course is a Coca-Cola trademark. 68
Notably, the Lanhatn Act provides that owners of similar and confusing marks can be
held liable for trademark infringement. 69 Confusion includes uncertainty between products, and
extends to confusion regarding endorsements, sponsorships, or any connection with the
trademark owner. 7

°

Confusion is further defined to include any uncertainty before and after

purchase. 71
Generally, the Lanhatn Act is enforced by applying the likelihood of conjitsion test in
trademark infringements. 72 The federal courts all apply a different version of a multi-factor test
to detennine whether a likelihood of confusion exists; however, the factors are generally the
san1e. 73 This Note will refer to the eight likelihood of confusion factors am1ounced in AMP Inc.

66

See Scandia Down Corp v. Euroquilty, Inc. 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he lower the costs of search
the more competitive the market. A trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality
products and to adhere to a consistent level of quality.")
67
Kane, supra note 63 (" While a brand name is always a trademark, a trademark is not always a brand name .
Trademarks can consist of a variety of words and symbols[.]").
68
Coca-Cola Co. v Snow Crest Beverages, 64 F. Supp. 980, 985 (D. Mass. 1946)
09
See 15 U.S .C. ~ 1114 (hi ghli ghting " likel.ihood of confusion"); Shakey's Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426,431 (9th
Cir. 1983), SIEGRUN D. KANE, RELATION BETWEEN TRADEMARKS AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ,
TRADEMARK L.: PRAC. GUIDE§ 1:1.5 (2011) (stating that unfair acts include trade name infringement where a
business ' name is likely to cause confusion with an established business name).
70
See Shakey 's, 704 F.2d at 431, SIEGRUN D. KANE, CONSUMER PROTECTION : TI-lE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
STANDARD, TRADEMARKL.: PRAC . GUIDE §1 :3 (2011) .
71
See KANE, supra note 70.
72
See 15 USCA § 1051 [West]; Polaroid Corp v. Polarad Elecs. Corp ., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding
that plaintiffs delay in bringing an infringement suit against defendant a similar mark in a different business barred
plaintiff from bringing a claim against defendant).
73
Compare, AMF Inc . v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 , 348 (9th Cir. 1979) ("In determining whether confusion
between related goods is likely, the following factors are relevant: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the
goods; (3) similarity of the marks ; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods
and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8)
likelihood of expansion of the product lines."), with Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 ("(i) the strength of the mark, (ii) the
degree of similarity between the two marks, (iii) the proximity of the products; (iv) the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap, (v) actual confusion, (vi) the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own

11

v. Sleekcraft Boats. 74 Under that test, courts examine the following factors to detern1ine whether
a likelihood of confusion exists:
(1) the strength of the n1ark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) sin1ilarity of the
marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) tnarketing channels used; (6) type of
goods and the degree of care likely to be excercised by the purchaser; (7)
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the
75
.
pro duct 11nes.
i.

Strength of a mark

Moreover, a traden1ark's strength can fall into one of four categories. 76 The four categories
of strength are: (1) arbitrary and fanciful,

77

(2) suggestive, 78 (3) descriptive, 79 and (4) generic.

80

Courts have defined the phrase "arbitrary and fanciful" as words that have no connection
with the product or service; however, courts provide the greatest protection to such marks. 81 For
example, KODAK is an arbitrary and fanciful mark because the word "Kodak" has nothing to do
with film. 82

Indeed, thinking of the word Kodak immediately produces the in1age of that

particular film company, and nothing else.

83

Next, courts define "suggestive" tnarks as those that portray son1ething about a particular

mark, (vii) the quality of defendant's product, and (viii) the sophistication of the buyers").
See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348.
75
See id.
76
See SIEGRUN D. KANE, FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING LIKELY CONFUSION, Trademark L. : Prac. Guide
§8:1.3 (2011).
77
See Kookai, S.A. v. Shabo, 950 F.Supp 605, 607 (S .D. NY 1997) ("The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that an
arbitrary or fanciful mark, such as plaintiffs mark, which does not suggest the nature of plaintiffs business, is the
strongest of all marks.").
78
See Stix Products, Inc . v. United Merchants & Mfrs ., Inc., 295 F.Supp. 479, 488 (S .D. NY 1968) ("A term is
suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.).
79
See id. ("A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or
characteristics of the goods .").
80
See Enrique Bernat F ., S .A . v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439,445 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding "chupa" was a geneic
tenn in Spanish for lollipop so the district comi's finding of a likelihood of confusion against defendant's "chupa
gurts" was in eiTor).
81
See Eastman Kodak Co v. Photaz Imports Ltd., Inc., 853 F.Supp. 667,672 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); KANE, supra note
76.
82
See id.
83
See id.
74
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product or serv1ce, like CITIBANK. 84

The word CIT! merely suggests a "city" and BANK

suggests the service offered; thus, the merger of the words merely suggests a local city's bank. 85
Third, "descriptive" marks are relegated to those that immediately describe the product or
service, like "frosted flakes. " 86
Fourth, "generic" is the riskiest category because it provides no protection. Generic marks
are defined as the comn1on name for the product or service. 87

For example, the trademark

"Google" tnay smneday become generic because it has grown to tnean "perfom1 an internet
search;" in other words, the con1pany nan1e no longer serves only as the name of the company,
but as a everyday term.
One of the critical issues in trademark law is traden1ark preservation.88 Although one may
own a registered traden1ark, if the holder does not take the proper precautions to protect the
traden1ark, the strength of the 1nark and the protection given to it can din1inish drastically .89 The
mark's use must relate to an existing business. 90 Therefore, to protect a trademark the owner
should be vigilant to carefully search and select a mark that does not have possible conflicts.
The owner must use the mark publicly, properly, and continuously with the associated goods or
services.

91

Moreover, the mark holder should register the mark with the United States Patent

and Trademark Office, and be wary of infringements by third parties. 92
ii. Surnatnes as trademarks
84

See Citibank, N.A . v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F .2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[N]o other firm , bank or
otherwise, was using 'Citibank' as a trade name, trademark, or service mark.").
85
See id.
86
See id.
87
See Enrique Bernat F., S.A . v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F .3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2000) .
88
See SIEGRUN D . KANE, ESTABLISHING PRIORITY, TRADEMARK L.: PRAC. GUIDE §5.1 (20 11).
89
See id.
90
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U .S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting that "the right to a particular mark
grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular
trader and not to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property
except in connection with an existing business.")
91
See id.
92
See SIEGRUN D. KANE, INSTRUCTION, TRADEMARK L.: PRAC . GUIDE §.8 (2011) .
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The Lanham Act provides protections based on free-speech concerns. For exmnple, it
bars registering a generic or descriptive mark, surname or geographic tern1. 93 The Lanham Act
provides these protections so that it can preserve the rights of others to use needed tenns and
phrases.

94

A surname may only be registered on the Lanhmn Act's Principal Register if the

owner can show a secondary n1eaning.

95

Additionally, if the surnan1e belongs to a historical

figure and that name is not currently used as a surname the summne will not be subject to the
Lanham Act objection. 96

iii. Scandalous and ilnmoral marks are barred
More to the point, the Lanham Act bars registration of traden1arks that are immoral or
scandalous. 97

The registration of a 1nark that is immoral or scandalous can be barred from

registration but these objections must occur during the registration process. 98 The decisions on
whether a mark is immoral or scandalous are very inconsistent and are based on what may seem
vulgar. 99 The American population determines the standard of vulgar, therefore, old disputes do
. current d"1sputes. 100
not detennme

iv. Fair use
Defendants accused of trademark infringement have several important defenses at their

93

See 15 USCA § 1052 [West 2006] ("Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular
living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the
United States during the life of his widow, if any , except by the written consent of the widow."
94
See id.
95
LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, UNREGISTRABLE MARKS-SURNAMES, 4A CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP, §
26 :37 (4th Ed . 2012) .
96
See id.
97
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a)[West 2006].
98
See TRAVIS BURCHART, Dirty, Naughty, and Four-Letter Words : Where Trademarks End and Scandalous Matter
Begins, LEXISNEXIS .COM (May 24, 2011, 8:21 AM) available at http ://www.lexisnexis.com/community/copyrighttrademarklaw/blogs/copyrightandtrademarklawcommunity.com. Dillinger should have most likely been considered
a slanderous or immoral mark because of Dillinger's life of crime.
99
LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, UNREGISTRABLE MARKS-IMMORAL OR SCANDALOUS MARKS , 4A CALLMANN
ON UNFAIR COMP , § 26 : 15(4th Ed . 2012).
100
See id.
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disposal. 101 The defense at issue in Dillinger v. EA is fair use, which derives fron1 the First
Amendment. 102 The doctrine of fair use is supported by policies that favor the public's interest
in free speech. 103 The Lanham defines fair use as:
[U]se of the name, tenn or device charged to be an infringement as a use,
otherwise than as a tnark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of
the individual nan1e of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin. 104
Fair use may be one of the more problematic defenses as it relates to intellectual property
because the court 1nust weigh First Amendn1ent rights of free speech against the right of a
trademark owner's exclusive use of a mark. 105 Fair use in the trademark context, requires that
the n1ark not be used as a trademark. This distinction is not always clear.
b. Federal court decisions in First Amendment and trademark infringetnent

cases
Generally, trademark law uses the likelihood of confusion test to detennine whether a
traden1ark infringement exists.'

06

However, when there is a trademark infringe1nent clain1 and a

defendant raises a fair use defense, courts apply different tests. 107 Although, common sense

101

See SIEGRUN D . KANE, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, TRADEMARK L. : PRAC . GUIDE§ 12:2 (2011). (Listing the
affirmative defenses of (i) laches and acquiescence, (ii) estoppel, (iii) abandonment, (iv) fair use, (v) genericness,
(vi) fraud in the procurement and maintenance of trademark registrations, (vii) unclean hands, (viii) trademark
misue, and (ix) violation of antitrust laws .)
102
See Dillinger, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 64006, at *2, SIEGRUN D. KANE, FAIR USE, TRADEMARK L.: PRAC. GUIDE
§12:2.4(2011).
103
See id.
104
See 15 U.S.C .A. § 1115 (West 2006).
105
See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, DESCRIPTIVE USE (FAIR USE), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28 (20 12).
106
See 15 USCA § 1051 [West].
107
Compare, Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1005 ("To properly analyze this issue, the Court must therefore consider a twopart test: First, the Court must determine whether the use of the mark has any artistic relevace to the underlying
work whatsoever; second, if the use of the trademark has some relevance, the Court must determine whether it
explicitly misleads the public as to the source or content of the work"), with Twin Peaks Prod. Inc. v Pub! 'n Int' I,
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379-1380 (holding that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act unless the title has no
artistic relevance, however, if the title does have artistic relevance the title must explicitly mislead the public
according to the Polaroid factors .), No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 F.Supp . 1381, 1383-1384 (C.D. Cali.
1995) (analyzing Rogers' first prong by determining artistic relevance and the second prong by analyzing the
likelihood of confusion factors, and then weighing Plaintiffs showing of likelihood of confusion against defendants'
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would tell us that the likelihood of confitsion test would be the predon1inant test because it comes
directly from the Lanham Act, it is not. 108

Even worse, federal courts have inconsistently

analyzed whether a First Amendment defense has any validity in trademark infringen1ent
claims. 109 Additional discussion of this i1nportant issue follows in the next section.
i.

Artistic relevance test

The Second Circuit decision, Rogers v. Grimaldi, provides the predominant test followed
by several other courts, the artistic relevance test.

110

In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court held that

the Lanhmn Act does not prohibit the minimal use of a celebrities' nan1e, in the title of an artistic
111
In Rogers, Ginger Rogers sued
work, if such use does not specifically denote endorsen1ent.

defendants for distributing a motion picture named Ginger and Fred. 112 The film concerned the
story of two fictional characters that i1nitated Fred Astaire and plaintiff, who later becan1e known
as "Ginger and Fred." 113 Among plaintiffs other clain1s, she alleged that the defendants violated
the Lanham Act by creating a false i1npression that she was smnehow affiliated with the film. 114
The court believed that the Lanham Act should apply to artistic works only when
avoiding consumer confusion outweighed the public's interest in free expression.

115

The court

further noted that if a title is not artistically relevant, its free expression interest was not justified

First Amendment concerns), and Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d at 959 (stating that the
"no adequate altemative avenues" test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression"
and that "[P]roof of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of confusion"),
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Tnc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To prevail on her Lanham Act
claim, White is required to show that in running the robot ad, Samsung and Deutsch created a likelihood of
confusion"), and Mutual of Omaha, Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d at 397 ("Mutual trademarks are a form of property,
and Mutual's rights therein need not "yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.") (citations omitted).
108
See 15 USCA § 1051 [West].
109
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6 111 Cir. 2003) .
110
See LALONDE, supra note 3.
111
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F .2d 994, 1005 (2nd Cir.1989).
112
See id. at 996-997.
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
See id.
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and was arguably rnisleading.

116

-----

The two prong artistic relevance test requires two inquiries: (1)

is the use of the title n1inimally artistically relevant; and (2) if the title is artistically relevant does
it explicitly mislead. 117 However, the Rogers artistically relevant threshold is so low that almost
anything qualifies as artistically relevant.

118

Effectively, the artistically relevant test protects

every title with the slightest artistic relevance as long as it does not explicitly mislead.

119

For

instance in this case, the court granted sun1n1ary judgment in favor of Grimaldi because it found
that the title Ginger and Fred was artistically relevant to the film because the film's title did not
explicitly indicate that Ginger Rogers endorsed it in any way.

120

Following its sister circuit, the Sixth Circuit, in Parks v. LaFace Records, chose to use
the artistic relevance test over using the alternative avenues test and the likelihood of confusion
test. 121 In Parks v. LaFace Records, Rosa Parks sued OutKast for using her nan1e as the title of
one of its songs. 122 Just like the arguments raised by EA in Dillinger v. EA, OutKast argued that
Rosa Parks' Lanham Act claitn must fail because it did not use her name as a tradetnark, and the
First An1endn1ent protected the title of the song.

123

The court, in tun1, stated that "the First

An1endment cannot permit anyone who cries 'artist' to have carte blanche protection when it
con1es to nan1ing and advertising his or her works .... "

124

There, the court adopted the Rogers

test and remanded the case so that the jury could determine whether "Rosa Parks" had any
artistic relevance to the song. 125 The case settled before there was a decision on ren1and, which

11 6

See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2nd Cir.1989).
See id.
118
See id.
11 9
See id. at 994.
120
See id. at 1004.
121
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437,450 (6 111 Cir. 2011).
122
Seeid. at441.
123
See id. at 446-447 .
124
See id. at447.
125
See id.
117
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left the legal con1n1unity wondering whether Outkast or Rosa Parks would have prevailed. 126
In Matte!, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit also adopted the artistically relevant

test.

Unlike, Parks, this case was not settled and provided in1portant insight into a court's

application of the artistically relevant test.
song named "Barbie Girl."

128

127

In this case, the Danish band Aqua produced a

The single was a hit and made it onto the Top 40 music charts

during its release. 129 Mattei, the famous toy company known for creating the cultural icon,
Barbie, sued MCA Records for producing this song. 130 The court granted stnnmary judgment to
MCA Records, on Mattei's federal and state law claims for trademark infringement and
tradetnark dilution. 131

The Court found that the song's title "Barbie Girl" was artistically

relevant because the song was about Barbie and Ken, who was Barbie's significant other. 132
Moreover, the song n1ade an actual reference to Barbie and Ken and symbolized other people
like then1. 133

According to the court, the song did not explicitly tnislead consumers by

suggesting Mattei endorsed it.

134

The only indication that associates Mattei with the song is the

word "Barbie" in the title. 135 The court further noted that if the word "Barbie" were enough to
satisfy the misleading prong of the artistic relevance test, the test would be useless. 136 Fron1 the
reasoning in this case, one can see that the threshold for artistic relevance is n1inin1al.
As more courts began to use the artistic relevance test tnany also began to modify the

126

See Rosa Parks Settles Suit Over OutKast CD, CNN.COM (April 15, 2005) http:l/articles.cnn.com/2005-0415/entertainment/parks.settlement_l_rosa-parks-raymond-parks-institute-3 81-day-boycott? _ s=PM :SHOWBIZ.
127
See Mattei, inc. V. MCA Records, Inc, .296 f.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
128
See id. at 899.
129

See
See
131
See
132
See
133
See
130

id.
id.
id.

Mattei, inc. Y. MCA Records, Inc, .296 f.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
id at 898 . ("Barbie was born in Gem1any in the 1950s as an adult collector's item. Over the years, Matte!
transformed her from a doll that resembled a "German street walker," as she originally appeared, into a glamorous ,
long-legged blonde. Barbie has been labeled the ideal American woman and a bimbo .") .
134
See id. at 902.
135

136

See id.
See id.
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test. For exatnple, in No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., the court used the first prong from

Rogers v. Grimaldi's artistic relevance test and then determined the misleading prong by
analyzing the likelihood of confusion test, and then weighed Plaintiffs showing of likelihood of

. agmns
. t th e artzstzc
. . re levance prong.
fzuszon

COf1:

137

In this case, the plaintiff used No Fear as its logo for sporting goods and jewelry and it
was suing the defendant, Universal Studios, for producing a fihn called No Fear. 138 The filn1 No

Fear was about a disturbed young male adult who seduces a younger girl and terrorizes her
family. 139 The young tnan in the movie engages in multiple n1urders, and animal mutilation. 140
The District Court first decided that the movie title was artistically relevant to the contents of the
filn1; and yet, the court denied summary judgment because it did not find a showing of likelihood
of confusion between the movie and the registered mark. 141
The court in No Fear, explained that Rogers v. Grimaldi's artistic relevance test was
limited to cases involving the use of a celebrity's nan1e in a movie title 142 As a result, courts
have expanded the artistic relevance test to include numerous other areas of expressive
conduct. 143 The court also states:
There is no doubt substantial confusion in the case law about the precise role of
the likelihood of confusion factors in the application of the rule articulated in
Rogers. 144

No Fear illustrates the apparent confusion federal courts have regarding the proper application of
the artistic relevance test. The court in that case quite clearly conflated two separate tests to
reach its desired result.
137

See
See
139
See
140
See
141
See
142
See
143
See
144
See
138

No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 Supp. 1381, 1383-1384 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
id. at 1381.
id. at 1382.
id.
id. at 1384.
No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 Supp. 1381, 1382 (C. D. Cal. 1995).
id.
id.
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ii. Likelihood of confusion view
The second test used by courts is the likelihood of confusion test. This is the test that is
traditionally used to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion. For example, in Elvis

Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, the court stated that the appropriate test in trademark
infringement cases was the traditional likelihood of confitsion test, which incorporates the
traditional likelihood of confusion factors. 145 In that case, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the factors
of the likelihood of confusion test and focused on advertising, parody, similarity of the disputed
1narks, sitnilarity of products and services, actual confusion, and the defendant's intent and
defenses.

l

46

Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. was the assignee and registrant of all trademarks

belonging to the Elvis Presley estate, and it sued Bany Capece for operating a restaurant and
tavern called "The Velvet Elvis."

147

The restaurant was a gaudy venue containing a multitude of

Elvis men1orabilia and a menu of Elvis's favorite dishes.

148

The defendant argued that the

restaurant was simply a parody which did not infringe on the Elvis trademark, but the Fifth
Circuit disagreed and stated that parody was only one of several factors in the likelihood of
confusion test. 149 Ultimately, the court found that Capece infringed the Elvis 1nark because
parody is only a factor to be the service mark was used in advertising that is likely to alter the
psychological impact of the mark, and the restaurant business was a natural area of expansion. 150
The problen1 with only applying the likelihood of confusion test in a First An1endment context is
that it gives no weight to First Amendn1ent concen1s because it treats the nan1e of an artistic the
. wou ld treat a comn1erc1a
. 1pro duct. 151
same way 1t

145

See
See
147
See
148
See
149
See
150
See
15 1
See
146

Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 207(5Lh Cir. 1998).
id. at 191-207.
id. at 191-192.
id. 192.
id.
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 198-203 (5th Cir. 1998).
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) .
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iii. Alternative avenues view

Of the available tests analyzing trademark infringement claims, the test least frequently
etnployed by courts is the alternative avenues test, which is also the test that most favors
traden1ark holders.

Under this test, courts detennine trademark infringetnent by deciding

whether an alternative equivalent title, mark, or work could be used. 152

For instance, in

American Dairy Queen, v. New Line Productions, the court used the alten1ative avenues test and
granted Dairy Queen a preliminary injunction. 153
In this case, the plaintiff, Dairy Queen, sued New Line Productions because of a title it
had chosen for 'its "mockutnentary," Dairy Queens.

154

This mockumentary 155 poked fun at the

beauty contests in the Midwest. 156 Plaintiff argued that defendant's use of the title Dairy Queens
infringed on its well-established tradetnark and that the public would associate its trademark with
the unwholesmne content of the film. 157 The court, however, referenced alten1ative titles such as

Dairy Princesses, that New Line Productions could have used. Ultin1ately, the court granted
Plaintiff the injunction and stated that defendant had various alternative avenues for the title of
its filn1. 15 8 The problem with only applying the alternative avenues test is that it is based on the
notion that a property owner may limit a person's self expression on their property.

159

When

this notion is extended to artists it lin1its every use of a mark if there are alternatives for the
artist's intended expression.

160

This test will always favor the tradetnark owner and give little

15 2

Seeid. at450.
See American Dairy Queen v . New Line Productions, 35 F.Supp .2d 727,735 (D . Minn . 1998) .
154
See id. at 728 .
155
A " mockumentary" is a satirical program in the form of a documentary . See id.
156
See id. at 728 .
157
See id. at 729 .
158
See American Dairy Queen v. New Line Productions, 35 F .Supp.2d 727, 735 (D. Minn. 1998).
15 9
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) .
160
See id.
153
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credence to the artist and first amendment rights. 161

c. The proposed test and its application to Dillinger v. EA

i.

The proposed test

Considering the inconsistency among the courts and the different policies promoted by
each test, both courts and litigants would be better served if one test decided trademark
infringement cases containing First Amendment issues. This proposed test actually combines the
three 1najor tests, which are the (1) the artistic relevance test; (2) the likelihood of confusion test;
and (3) the alternative avenues test.
Under the proposed test, the first prong would require courts to analyze the traditional
likelihood of confusion factors.

162

If such a confusion existed, then the court could proceed to

the second prong. To determine a likelihood of confusion the court would weigh the following
factors:
(1) the strength of the 1nark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) si1nilarity of the
1narks; ( 4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing chmmels used; (6) type of
goods and the degree of care likely to be excercised by the purchaser; (7)
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the
163
.
pro duct 11nes.
After detennining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the court could then detetmine the
degree of artistic relevance found in the disputed mark. Under the second prong of the proposed
test, if a court does not find artistic relevance, it will find for the plaintiff because there is a
trademark infringen1ent, similar to the modified artistic relevance test. 164 If, however, a court
found artistic relevance did exist, then the court would weigh the artistic relevance against the

alternative avenues test.

161

See
See
163
See
164
See
162

id.
AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F .2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979).
id.
No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 Supp. 1381, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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To clarify, under the proposed test, if a court finds m1nor artistic relevance, and an
alternative could work just as well, the court would find trademark infringement. However, if
the artistic relevance is so high that the absence of the 1nark would greatly diminish the artistic
work, then the court should decide favorably for the defendant.
For example, compare Rogers and Dairy Queen: the artistic relevance to the title of the
film was intricately woven into the plot of the film in Rogers, yet the title in Dairy Queens had
no relation to the 1nark and was n1erely catchy because of Dairy Queens' goodwill. 165 Although
n1any courts suggest or prefer the use of one test over another, not one has looked outside the
box. Courts should take a deeper look into balancing the rights involved and the policies that
each test individually promotes. 166 By applying all the tests in an analysis it would provide a fair
approach and consider each policy underlying each established test.

Figure 4: The Proposed Test
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ii. The proposed test applied to Dillinger v. EA

If the proposed were applied in Dillinger v. EA it would require the court to delve into a
165

See Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 994; see also Dairy Queen, 141 F.3d, at 191-207.
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deeper analysis and a n1ore favorable outcome to Dillinger, LLC. Under the first factor of the
likelihood of confusion prong, Dillinger, LLC would have the burden of showing the strength of
its mark, Dillinger. 167 Arguably, the Dillinger trademark registration could have been baned
because it was a surname, and because it belonged to a notorious crin1inal; but, the USPTO
actually approved the n1ark. 168 The USPTO's stamp of approval and lack of objection to the
registration gives credibility to the strength of the tnark.

Also, Dillinger, LLC's evident

diligence in pursuing litigation to prevent infringement would probably favor Dillinger, LLC in
detem1ining the strength of the mark.

169

Further, a general search for John Dillinger's name

shows that there are only forty-nine people in the United States with that natne, n1aking it a less
than common mark. 170 Additionally, many people probably associate the name with the gangster
and his crimes, which n1eans it has most likely acquired a secondary tneaning. Dillinger is a
fairly strong mark.
Under the second factor, one n1ust analyze the proxin1ity of the products. 171 Although,
Dillinger LLC has not used its names on guns it does plan to do so in the future, which is evident
from its cunent trademark. 172 EA is using Dillinger to name its video gan1e guns and J.D. is
known for using guns, specifically Tomn1y Guns.

173

The relatedness would be strong. Under the

third factor of the likelihood of confusion prong, one would determine whether the degree of
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See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9 1h Cir. 1979).
See Trademark Electronic Search System System, USPTO .COM,
http://tess2. uspto .gov/bin/showfield?f=toc&state=400 1%3Aa5age7 . 1.1 &p _ search=searchss&p_L=SO&BackReferen
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ce=&p_plural=yes&p_s_PARA1=&p_tagrepl~%3A=PARAl%24LD&expr=PARAI+AND+PARA2&p_s_PARA2

=dillinger&p_ tagrepl-%3A=PARA2%24COMB&p_op_ALL=AND&a_default=search&a_ search=Submit+Query&
a search=Submit+Query( last visited Jan . 29, 2012) (search for registrations of Dillinger).
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See id.
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See WHITEPAGES.COM, http://names.whitepages.com/john/dillinger (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (search engine).
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See Dillinger, 2011 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *7-8.
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similarity between the two marks is high. 174 EA is using Dillinger on its video game guns, the
surname of the mark.
Under the fourth factor of the first prong, one must analyze whether there was actual
confusion; however, Dillinger, LLC failed to show this. 175 Dillinger, LLC made efforts to show
that there was confusion when media uses a mark, but the court did not find it sufficient to show
actual confusion.
channels for both.

Under the fifth factor of the first prong, one must look at the n1arketing
Unfortunately, this can be shown through surveys, which can be fairly

expensive, however, current marketing strategies used in the gan1ing arena could strongly imply
a gamer would believe that a mark in a video game is endorsed by the owner. 176 Video games
have become an itnportant 1nediun1 for product placement. 177 Under the sixth factor, one must
look at the purchaser's degree of care. The mark Dillinger n1ay suggest to a gamer who likes
gangster tnob-related material that the mark is endorsed by affiliates of J.D., especially because
of current marketing practices in the gaming industry. 178 Seventh, EA stated that it could not
remember its reason for choosing Dillinger, but the Defendant's continued to use the mark after
being warned by Dillinger, LLC. 179 This could have assisted in showing defendant's possible
bad faith in the use of the mark, specifically its use in Godfather II.
The last factor under the likelihood of confusion prong requtres that plaintiff show
expansion of its market and Dillinger, LLC could have shown its expansion to gun products

174

See supra, p. 20.
See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U .S . Dist. LEX1S 64006, at* 19
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011).
176
See Product Placement on the Rise in Video Games: Marketers desperate to engage vvell-to-do market of 132
million gamers,MSNB .COM, (July 21, 2006) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13960083/ns/technology _and_sciencetech_ and_gadgets/t/product-placement-rise-video-games/#.TyiG4sUeN2A.
177
See id.
178
See id.
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See Dillinger, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *7-8.
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because it had a trademark registration with the USPT0.

180

The court in, Dillinger, LLC v. EA,

stated that use of a well-known gun manufacturer such as Smith & Wesson would be an
infringement. 181 Ulti1nately, the factors of the likelihood of confusion test were strongly in
Plaintiffs favor.
Under the artistic relevance prong, the court found Dillinger was slightly relevant to the
game because he was a criminal affiliated with that particular gun and the video game related to
mobsters. But, as discussed in the case, J.D. and the Godfather are based in two different time
eras and are different types of criminals. There is some artistic relevance but it is not nearly as
strong as the artistic relevance presented in Rogers.
Lastly, under the alternative avenues prong the court would have found that there were
equivalent substitutes to name the guns in the Godfather video game series. Although, the court
would have found that Dillinger was slightly relevant to the Godfather video gan1e series it
would not be sufficient to establish a necessary need by EA. The use of another nan1e, for
example, "Tomn1y Gun" would not diminish the value of the artistry of the game. The name
would be the nan1e of the actual gun, instead of the name of the gangster who was famous for
using the gun. The end result would have established a better analysis to detern1ine the rights of
Dillinger, LLC and EA.

Under this proposed test Dillinger, LLC most likely would have

prevailed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The First A1nendn1ent was designed to enable criticism of the govemn1ent and other

180
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See Dillinger, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *7-8 .
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entities without retaliation, which is why the fair use defense exists. t82 On the other hand, the
inadequate safeguarding of traden1arks can lead to grave econmnic dmnages for trademark
holders. 183 Federal courts should be consistent in their decisions of protecting the right to fair use
and the protections granted by trademarks.

Greater consistency among the Federal Courts in

applying a test that serves both the First Amendment's purpose, and enhances traden1ark
protections, is far past due.

For this reason, courts should apply the proposed test, which

incorporates the most useful aspects of the three tests in this legal area. 184

By removing

probletnatic areas that are frequently n1isinterpreted and misapplied, the proposed test actualy
furthers the in1portant interests of artists and trademark users.

Dillinger v. EA, is a great example of how the proposed test could have allowed the
litigants and the court to better understand that there was more at risk in that case then sin1ply
allowing a gan1ing company to make a profit frmn an item using a registered trademark. 185
Indeed, crucial First An1end1nent protections were at stake.
Unfortunately, one of the problems facing surrounding the utilization of a proper test to
analyze traden1ark infringement cases is that this problem may retnain unaddressed until circuit
courts wrestle with the tretnendous confusion found in the District Courts.t 86 A perfect example
is Parks v. LaFace Records, 187 or any other case where parties fail to advocate for a different test
during litigation.
While the Lanham Act and established case law should resolve traden1ark infringement
litigation a majority of the courts have decided that when a trademark issue faces a First
182

See Mike McCurry and Marek McKinnon, Free Speech Shouldn't be a Shield for Online Thieves,

FIERCETELECOM.COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 6:09AM), http://www.fiercetelecom .com/story/free-speech-shouldnt-be-
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183
See id.
184
See supra, pp . 20.
185
See supra, pp . 17.
186
See supra, note 15.
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Amendment issue, the First Amendn1ent issue always govetns. 188

This unfortunate pattern

followed by courts permits companies like EA to ditninish traden1ark rights because courts fail to
recognize that EA is a business making a profit 189 off of video games, and using the First
An1endtnent as a mere excuse to blatantly infringe a registered trademark. 190 Any supposed
artist work that uses a trademark should be treated like any other media that uses products,
sponsorships, or endorsements; it should be treated like a comn1ercial use excluding instances of
. . use an d paro dy. 191
nominative

The deterrence that the Lanham Act is supposed to promote

against infringement is lost in cases like Dillinger; indeed, because of the current confusion,
businesses like EA, who are constantly in litigation over these matters, generally win.
If courts continue to blindly apply the Rogers test the leeway for abuse by companies like
EA is limitless. The proposed test, by contrast, would ultitnately balance the equities for each
party.

Unless courts find a better way to balance these rights trademark rights will greatly

ditninish because of the minitnal artistic require1nent required by Rogers v. Grimaldi.

The

proposed test would provide better protection because it incorporates the Lanham Act's overall
purpose, by applying the likelihood of confusion test, it protects property rights by applying the
alternative avenues test, and it strengthens First Amendn1ent rights by applying the artistically
relevant test.
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